(written for POLI 333 at McGill University, Fall 2020)
Introduction
Late antique political philosophy in the Greek world was dominated by the legacies of Plato and Aristotle, and the conflict between their competing visions. They were also seen to disagree in metaphysics by philosophers of late antiquity, however Platonic and Neoplatonic commentators made it their project to reconcile them on the subject. This reconciliation of the two foremost philosophers of ancient Greece, dubbed the “Ammonian synthesis” for the Aristotelian commentator Ammonius Saccas (175–242 CE) who epitomized the project, was, however, limited to metaphysical theories. As in metaphysics and epistemology, Plato and Aristotle are apparently in contradiction on issues of political philosophy; Aristotle is explicitly critical of Plato’s communistic vision outlined in the Republic, and its feasibility. However, “[when] confronted with contradictions between Aristotle and Plato, Platonists argued that such contradictions were only apparent, the results of uncritical focus on the letter and not the real spirit of the texts.” (Karamanolis, 3). This essay is a thought experiment seeking to replicate, insofar as possible, the metaphysical Ammonian synthesis in the sphere of political thought, effecting a union of Plato and Aristotle, and making the case that the “real spirit of the texts” written by the two philosophers was essentially one. In essence, Aristotle’s work is a continuation of Plato’s project, and a ‘filling-out’ of their shared political vision according to the former’s bivalent concept of entelekheia (actuality/perfection) as teleiotês (endedness/final causality) and teleion (completeness/efficient causality), as elaborated by the Neoplatonists. Aristotle represents a continuation of the substance (nous) of Plato’s political ideal, consistent with his continuation of the latter in metaphysics as argued by Ammonius. There are differences between them, however these are either developments of Plato’s arguments, minor tweaks, or disagreements in method. In terms of substantive political vision, the two are the same: both imagine an enlightened aristocratic political order whose highest aim is the provision of conditions for the highest and most beautiful way of life. Both idealize a hierarchic, unequal society of true human beings and their slaves. Contrary to prevailing interpretations, Aristotle also agrees with Plato in the abolition of private life and the collapsing of the city’s divisions first into a single household, and ultimately into one organism. Aristotle is simply more conservative about the immediate prospects of realizing such a vision, and so offers more thoughts on the ideal political order until conditions would allow for the establishment of the ideal. The difference between Plato and Aristotle is not one of differing visions, but of focuses. One nous, different focuses, and linguistic formulation (lexis).
This essay will begin with a brief exposition of Plato and Aristotle’s political projects and their perceived disagreements, then explain the Platonist/Neoplatonist harmonization of the two philosophers in metaphysics and its applicability in politics. The bulk of the essay will treat a number of issues addressed both in Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s Politics, applying the methods of the commentators to prove the unity of the two texts.
The Apparent Contradiction
Surface-level readings of the Republic and the Politics reveal significant disagreements between the texts. Plato imagines a communistic society ruled by guardian sages, which aims to remake the city as one giant household, or even more ideally a single being. Aristotle, by contrast, envisions a constitutional government; an oligarchic democracy working for the happiness of its citizens and beautiful lives. In brief, the chief disagreements on which Aristotle is seen to dissent from Plato may be summarized as a rejection of the latter’s desire to abolish private property, and indeed any private sphere whatsoever which is separate from the public interest. This includes the abolition of private property and commerce (Plato, 462c), monogamous marriages and private child-rearing in favour of public solutions managed by the guardians of the city (polis) (ibid., 457c-d). Socrates, speaking for Plato, asks rhetorically “is [not] that city best governed which is most like a single human being?” (ibid., 462c). Aristotle challenges Platon on these points in the Politics (Aristotle, 1263a, 1261a-b).
The Greater Harmony and Efficient Causality
The project of the Aristotelian commentators to reconcile and synthesize the philosophy of Aristotle with that of Plato, is termed by Wisnovsky (2003) as the “greater harmony” (sumphônia) (Wisnovsky, 15). The “lesser harmony” was a prior project of the commentators to draw out from the often unclear and/or contradictory Aristotelian corpus a definite, coherent philosophical worldview; that is, to reconcile Aristotle with himself before doing so with Plato (ibid.). The lesser and greater harmonies became intertwined, as the language and terms developed by Neoplatonist commentators on Aristotle proved invaluable to reconciling his philosophy with that of Plato. Indeed, such was the interest in Aristotle among followers of Plato that known commentaries on Aristotle’s works after 300 AD were written exclusively by Neoplatonists (Karamanolis, 1). Their terms and concepts will be used here to similar effect with the philosophers’ respective political writings.
The thesis of a true substantial unity between Plato and Aristotle begins with Ammonius Saccas, an Egyptian philosopher regarded as one of the founders of Neoplatonism (Karamanolis, 200). “Ammonius”, of a probing personality, “first made good sense of the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle through the study of their texts, and then, on the basis of such an understanding […] concluded that the nous [substance] behind their doctrines was the same.” (ibid., 200). He was partially preceded in this belief by the Platonist Antiochus of Ascalon (ca. 125–ca. 68 BCE). Antiochus believed Plato had articulated the substance of a comprehensive philosophical doctrine, however this had only been properly systematized by Aristotle and the Peripatetics (ibid., 51). Thus, Aristotle’s system was derived from Plato’s, and was essentially a means to reconstruct Plato’s original philosophy. Antiochus’ idea of Aristotle as explaining Plato is repeated by Ammonius; the latter distinguishes between the nous of Plato and Aristotle’s writings, which he held to be the same, from the lexis, viz. the linguistic formulation which may be misleading owing to shortcomings of the author or language (ibid., 200). By stripping away the confusion that arises from differences in lexis between the primary sources, and that introduced by commentators, Ammonius hoped to illustrate the underlying unity of vision between the two philosophers (ibid., 203). Looking directly at the primary sources unmediated by commentators, as counseled by Ammonius, Aristotle’s Politics can be understood as a development upon ideas first posited by Plato in the Republic, as Antiochus argued for their respective metaphysics.
In the Metaphysics, Aristotle introduces the term entelekheia, translated into English variously as actuality, fulfillment, perfection and completion (Wisnovsky, 21). The term is, however, bivalent; Aristotle uses it to refer to both actuality and potentiality. Later commentators, such as Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. 205 CE) were puzzled about which sense Aristotle had intended, and if both, how to resolve that contradiction. The solution arrived at was that, in the case of the soul, when one is merely knowledgeable of a thing and not actively contemplating it, they are in the ‘first actuality’ of its knowledge. When one is actively contemplating, cognizing the knowledge, the ‘second actuality’ is realized. Thus, to go from ignorance to knowledge or knowledge to contemplation of an object is not a change in quality for the soul, but simply a difference in relation to the object of thought. Aristotle’s Entelekheia, then, refers to first and second actuality, rather than potentiality (Wisnovsky,23f).
The Neoplatonists had further insights to realize the lesser harmony, with implications for the greater. Themistius (317–ca. 390 CE) invented the new term of “endedness” (teleiotês) as counterpart to Aristotle’s ‘completeness’ (teleion) as a tool to interpret his work (Wisnovsky, 4). The Neoplatonic breakthrough for understanding Aristotle consisted of a combination of his use of entelekheia to refer to states of being with the Neoplatonic teleiotês and teleion, viz. final and efficient causes of being (Wisnovsky, 64). For Neoplatonists,
“the perfect operated as an efficient cause and […] [and] perfection operated as a final cause” (ibid., 67).
The Neoplatonic synthetic schema of teleiotês and teleion can be used to resolve the differences in the political visions of Plato and Aristotle. Plato’s republic is perfection, the final cause of political life, and Aristotle’s constitutional regime is the perfect, operating as the efficient cause. In this way, the ideal political orders envisioned by both authors can both be correct with regards to one another. Aristotle sketches out in his Politics a less radical vision for political life, consciously within the reach of most cities (Aristotle, 1295a) which may be understood as the efficient cause of political striving towards greater prosperity and a more just society. While he acknowledges that aristocracy is the true ideal, constitutionalism may be the best possible alternative under imperfect conditions. “Aristotelian political science […] investigates the second-best constitution or even inferior political systems, because this may be the closest approximation to full political justice which the lawgiver can attain under the circumstances” (Miller). Full political justice, the best constitution, is ultimately the Platonic republic. Its realization lies in the undefined future, posterior to the event of real political life, but it pulls this event towards it as its teleion and entelekheia.
Bringing Plato and Aristotle into sumphônia
Plato and Aristotle are in clear agreement on the ultimate telos of political life: the search for ‘the good’ above all else. Aristotle writes that all political, economic and personal life is the pursuit of a hierarchy of goods, the most superior of which is the good of the soul (Aristotle, 1323b). In the Politics he writes that the city is the most sovereign and important of all man’s associations aimed at the good (1252a). Plato agrees: “each of us must, to the neglect of other studies […] learn […] to distinguish the good and the bad in life, and so everywhere and always to choose the better from among those that are possible” (618c). Likewise for both philosophers, everything has its telos, and its place in the hierarchy of being aimed at realizing these goods. Per Aristotle, the world is full of instruments, all of which have uses and purposes. Everything is teleological; everything that is has its telos (Aristotle, 1253b). The telos of a thing determines its place in the hierarchy of ruler and ruled, ordained by nature (Plato, 444d). Kings rule over subjects, and the competent over the incompetent (ibid., 576e). Plato holds that these competent individuals suited for leadership are found spread among men and women alike (ibid., 455c-e), while Aristotle writes that “the male is by nature more suited to leadership than the female, unless something in his make-up runs contrary to nature…” (Aristotle, 1259b). The “unless” here implies that certain men are not more suitable for political authority than women, meaning Aristotle is essentially in agreement with Plato on the proper political stations of the sexes.
To institutionalize the truth of the natural hierarchy among humans, Aristotle proposes a regime type he claims Plato had not recognized: aristocracy. He describes a meritocracy where office holders are selected on the basis of wealth and personal excellence (Aristotle, 1293a-b). In this case Aristotle is systematizing Plato’s philosophy rather than correcting it, as Antiochus might argue. Plato also advocated aristocracy; he argues that offices be held by the best (Plato, 412c), and the purpose of the city is to produce the best men and women, who will govern themselves as free human beings (Plato, 456e). This shared desire between the philosophers to produce the ‘best’ men and women extends to a shared appreciation for the benefits of state eugenics programs. Plato describes an elaborate system of eugenic orgiastic rituals and sharing of children among all citizens, “if the flock is going to be of the most eminent quality” (Plato,459a-460c). Aristotle likewise warns against the uncontrolled reproduction of the inferior “slavish” classes and advocates state-enforced population quotas (Aristotle, 1265b). He is critical of Plato’s plan to hold wives and children in common within the city, however this criticism is simply of a mechanical nature, not of the aims. Aristotle, like Plato, believes in a degree of state regulation over sexual and family affairs, and that the state ought ultimately to be striving for the human good of living well.
Social collectivization schemes such these provoke the most intractable disagreements Aristotle raises against Plato. Aristotle writes that the city is by nature a multiplicity, and not a single body as Plato proposes to make it (Aristotle, 1261a). However, Plato is entirely in agreement with Aristotle on this point; the city is a multiplicity in his view. Plato hopes to abolish the city as such in favour of a greater unity and higher good, which is a society that is like a single man. The ideal philosopher kingdom would produce “the image of man, […] and the image of god” (Plato, 501b). Aristotle writes that the city is the highest of man’s associations aimed at the good, and that living in society is necessary for its achievement (Aristotle, 1252a). He further writes that if one cannot come to live in society peaceably, one is less than human, while if one can subsist independent of society, one is something greater than human, and praises the solitary life (Aristotle, Book VII). Aristotle implies here that the options he lays out are actually possible, and not merely rhetoric. If man can live alone, he can reach a sort of ‘superhumanity’. This superhumanity of which Aristotle considers the possibility is precisely the ideal form of political organization proposed by Plato. It is the most just, harmonious, and “beautiful” (to use Aristotle’s language) organization of human instrumentality to generate the best men and women. It uses men at all levels, and makes them as one body, which can pursue philosophy (the highest work of man) without impediment. The ultimate Platonic ideal of a city “most like a single human being” is an ideal, the distant final cause which motivates political striving and for which Aristotle’s second-best regime is the efficient cause. This is not immediately apparent because, as the Neoplatonists write, the efficient cause is more likely to be judged the cause of an event because it must temporally precede its effect. The final cause is simultaneous or temporally posterior to its effect, and thus less immediately connected to the real event (Wisnovsky, 2003: 67). That is, regular political life will appear to work towards Aristotle’s regime, while it is ultimately working towards Plato’s by way of the former. “Must it not be an impossibility for anything that is worth calling a city to be slavish by nature? A city is self-sufficient, and something slavish is not self-sufficient.” (Aristotle, 1291a). This passage is significant because Aristotle here implies that true cities have the same essential qualities he elsewhere ascribes to true humans, uniting the ideal man and the ideal city as one (ibid., 1255a). Despite his acceptance that the city is inherently a multiplicity, for Aristotle, its goal is towards its own abolition into perfect unity. “A city is in fact meant to be made up of people who are equal and alike to the greatest possible extent, and this is present most of all among those in the middle range” (Aristotle, 1295b). Once again, Aristotle can be understood with Antiochus’ thesis as providing further explanation for Plato’s program, here specifying the class of people who most easily unite. Both philosophers affirm the critical importance of citizens’ belief in the identity and project of their polis. Plato argues that the young above all must not be told that the gods of the founding myths were responsible for evils, at risk of the city’s ruination (Plato, 379e-380a). This inculcates negative associations with authority and tradition. The people must believe in their government, the whole project of their polis and what it stands for, unmarred by gray morality. “For if a form of government is going to survive,” writes Aristotle, “all the parts of the city have to want it to exist and to continue along the same lines.” (Aristotle, 1270b). What else is this but evidence Aristotle affirms with Plato that the more unanimous the city’s people are in support of their government and its purpose, the more enduring it will be? Although more time is spent in discussion of the more immediately applicable constitutional regime, the Politics nevertheless includes indications of the final purpose of Aristotle’s political theory, which is the communal polis of Plato.
Conclusion
Though the answer to the question of this essay was in a way a foregone conclusion, given the nature of the thought experiment, it has, I hope, raised up valid points in arguing that Aristotle and Plato agree far more than they differ, despite the surface rejection by Aristotle of many the latter’s political doctrines. By applying the theories of late antique philosophical commentators who contributed so greatly to the understanding of these thinkers in metaphysics, it becomes apparent that the nous of their political writings are one, as Ammonius might argue. As the efficient cause of politics to Plato’s ultimate cause, Aristotelian political theory in the Politics is ultimately an emphatic confirmation of the Republic’s utopia.
Bibliography
Aristotle. (2012). Politics (J. Sachs, Trans.). Focus Publishing: An Imprint of Hackett Publishing Company.
Karamanolis, G. E. (2006). Plato and Aristotle in Agreement?: Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry. In Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? Oxford University Press. http://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0199264562.001.0001/acprof-9780199264568
Plato. (1991). The Republic of Plato (A. Bloom, Trans.; Second edition). HarperCollins Publishers.
Wisnovsky, R. (2003). Avicenna’s Metaphysics in Context. Cornell University Press.
